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ABSTRACT: The aftermath of the recent financial crisis has introduced several reg-
ulative challenges within the European Union (EU). One of these relates to the 
rules applicable to banking and financial markets, including the renewal of Euro-
pean banking supervisory and resolution systems, which in turn has meant a new 
approach to the relationship between the financial sector and the real economy.  
The aim of the paper is to provide the reader with a precise review of the 
most important regulatory reforms in the EU that could address the need for fi-
nancing sources available to industrial markets. At the same time, the analysis 
takes into account the most problematic issues currently concerning the European 
banking system, and the significant ineffectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policies. 
Specific attention is paid to European long-term investment funds and the 
new regulations applicable to them. The analysis provides evaluations of future 
development opportunities among European mid-tier enterprises. The paper con-
cludes by highlighting some general concerns that may influence market stability, 
as well as the need for speedier economic growth. 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. European integration and financial markets: new rules for market 
stability and regional development- 3. The role of alternative financing sources in the SMEs sys-
tem: a brief overview - 4. The introduction of European long term investment funds – 5. Con-
cluding remarks. 
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1. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis the European authorities 
focused their attention on ensuring long-term financial stability and avoiding new 
global threats that could jeopardise regional integrity, financial stability, and eco-
nomic growth. In this respect, a new regulative framework has been introduced, 
which aims to set up rules for a European supervisory system, a European resolu-
tion and recovery system, and common standards for depositors’ funds. Moreo-
ver, a new Investment Plan for Europe has been adopted in order to provide 
deeper bases for sustainable growth and resources for European economic mar-
kets.    
Over the past few years, some European States (namely Spain, Ireland and 
Greece) have experienced severe difficulties in their financial markets, their eco-
nomic basics have become very fragile, and banking instability has caused general 
turmoil in these nations. That unstable framework was quickly transmitted across 
the entire European Union, prompting several questions about long-term Euro-
pean resilience and sustainability.  
Those national collapses and consequent threats were the symptoms of 
deeper diseases that are still affecting economic and financial markets to this day. 
In fact, as the European Banking Authority has recently declared, the EU is actually 
characterized by an unprepared banking system that is suffering setbacks stem-
ming from exposures to risky assets and poor management strategies1. Further-
more, fragility continues to affect financial markets, and is turning into volatility in 
banks’ funding spreads and elevated conduct risks2.  
With regard to the banking system, European banks and national authori-
ties have shown inadequate approaches to Banking Union and supranational 
banking regulation that in some European Member States have become deeply 
                                                          
1
See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, Risk Assessment of the European banking system, 
January 2016. 
2
See CCP RESEARCH FOUNDATION, Conduct Cost Project Report 2015, July 2016. 
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exacerbated by national political instability and social criticism3. The underlying 
reason for this is that over-reliance on banks is a widespread phenomenon among 
European countries; in fact, some economic scholars recently pointed out that the 
European economic system is more strongly focused on banks than the USA’s sys-
tem is. As a result, the 2008 financial crisis caused a deeper long-term impact on 
the European market than the USA’s; hence, the former is experiencing a very low 
economic growth rate.4   
Despite expectations, the overall effects of recent banking and financial 
reforms have been strictly limited, with the result that the current banking system 
actually resembles that of 2006, especially concerning the problematic aspects of 
institutions deemed “too big to fail” (e.g. in the case of Italian banks generally and 
Monte Paschi di Siena in particular), and their spillover effects for the rest of the 
financial system and for the real economy.5  
 The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the 
European financial markets, some relevant problems affecting the banking and in-
dustrial system, and finally, some financial intermediaries that might boost eco-
nomic growth and financing opportunities for European enterprises (especially 
SMEs). Section 3 undertakes a brief overview of alternative financing sources for 
SMEs, largely introduced by recent European regulations. Section 4 briefly anal-
yses Long-term Investments Funds, before section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. During the past few years, policies of European integration have implied 
new legislative initiatives concerning with regard to (i) European banking supervi-
sion, (ii) economic growth, and (iii) the minimization of systematic risks across 
countries. Firstly, it is worth noting that we benefit nowadays from supranational 
                                                          
3
See CAPRIGLIONE – SACCO GINEVRI, Politics and Finance in the European Union. The 
reason for a difficult encounter, Torino, 2016, Chapter I. 
4
See LANGFIELD – PAGANO, Bank Bias in Europe:Effects on Systemic Risk and Growth, ECB 
Working Papers Series, no. 1797, May 2015. 
5
See JOHNSON, The End of Big Banks, February 29 2016, available on Project Syndicate; ID., 
Failure at the Financial Stability Board, November 30 2015, on Project Syndicate. 
 
 
     85 
 
  
regulation of bankruptcy, in line with the introduction of cross-border services, in-
ternational banking institutions, and globalization. In fact, bankruptcy seems to be 
one of the most important parts of banking regulation; also, former Italian banking 
regulation from 1936 provides a huge legislative framework concerned with 
banking crises as the banking business was (and still is) inherently risky and, above 
all, it involves savings from depositors and naïve investors.  
A new approach to bankruptcy and financial stresses was adopted by the 
EU in order to implement new recovery and resolution rules for banking crises; 
thus, a more consistent framework for banking regulation became the optimal 
choice for solving a large set of problems relating to financial instability and a non-
homogeneous playing field. And, in fact, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Di-
rective (2014/59/EU) forms part of the EBU’s second pillar as long as it represents 
one of the major goals of the ambitious Banking Union. Nevertheless, the BRRD 
results in a minimal harmonisation of bank resolution rules, perhaps because the 
European regulator has taken into account the effective need for a gradual recon-
struction of the entire banking and resolution system in place of radical and unex-
pected reforms. However, innovative rules for financial markets and banking cri-
ses seem to be insufficient to boost growth and economic recovery across the EU. 
Additionally, a vicious circle involving sovereign debt and bank debt has been cre-
ated, especially in some European countries such as Spain, Greece and Ireland 
whose governments had to bail banks out at enormous cost to the entire popula-
tion.  
What also seems relevant here is that institutional players such as the Basel 
Committee and the International Monetary Fund highlighted that national au-
thorities should have the tools to activate an orderly resolution of all types of fi-
nancial institutions, as the possession of these might contribute to the minimiza-
tion of systemic risk, the protection of consumers, the limitation of moral hazard, 
and overall, the promotion of market efficiency.  
Secondly, European economic growth is not sustained by the banking sys-
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tem. Banks do not adequately meet the financial expectations of the real economy 
and SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). This is because banks do not 
have adequate incentives to offer new forms of financial resources to businesses, 
despite the monetary policies pursued to date by the ECB and the political-institu-
tional efforts made by institutional parties6. On the other hand, in fact, banking in-
termediaries are unable to carry out a re-composition of their assets, clear their 
portfolios from government bonds and use the available sums to provide credit to 
businesses and families; indeed, this operation could prove to be detrimental in 
terms of capital reserves (and possibly also in asset quality reviews), since the lat-
ter are very low (if not absent) when the bank holds government bonds, while 
they are more conspicuous when the bank holds private client loans. 
The relationship between banking institutions and SMEs is of vital im-
portance, especially for those enterprises lacking direct access to capital markets 
(and which are not mini-bond issuers); for instance, Italian companies can essen-
tially only count on self-financing and on bank lending, thus suffering the effects of 
business cycles, as well as being vulnerable to fluctuations in interest rates. In ad-
dition, they mostly have access to short-term debt (instead of long/medium term 
loans), and are therefore largely discouraged from implementing new long-term 
business projects and from planning new production initiatives. 
For this reason, financial disintermediation is becoming an increasingly 
common phenomenon across the EU and the USA, and is substantially encourag-
ing the gradual transition to non-bank-centric markets specifically advocated by 
the European Commission in Capital Markets Union Action Plan on the 30th Sep-
tember 20157. Not surprisingly, EU institutions underlined the role of direct lend-
ing and the multiple forms of peer-to-peer lending available in international mar-
kets: a good example is crowdfunding, which has become extremely popular and 
                                                          
6
See VAROUFAKIS, The Politics of Negative Interest Rates, available at Project Syndicate, 
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effective among innovative start-ups and high tech business projects8.  
More generally, it is worth mentioning that according to the Italian legisla-
tive decree no. 91 of June 24, 2014, the so-called "Decreto Competitività", con-
verted with amendments by Law no. 116 of 11 August 2014, in addition to banks 
and traditional financial intermediaries, the issue of borrowing financial resources 
is currently also allowed in relation to insurance companies9 and securitization 
companies10, as well as to SICAVs and SICAFs and some categories of investment 
funds11. 
Lastly, the current financial and banking market is affected by the monetary 
policies adopted by the ECB and their poor expected results12. In fact, two catego-
ries of problems are related to negative rates in the financial markets: the first is 
due to the complete disconnection between the financial market and the banking 
market, where the former is characterized by very low rates (which are basically 
intended to stimulate the circulation of money), while the banking system is still 
unable to give credit, except to large enterprises (which have no need for relief on 
credit, because they are stable enough to operate autonomously). In this respect, 
SMEs are still excluded from efficient banking channels, hence the investment 
funds might have a relevant role and cooperate with the banking system creating 
                                                          
8
See MOLLICK, The dynamics of crowdfunding: an explanatory study, Journal of Business 
Venturing, vol. 29, no. 1, 2014; KUPPUSWAMY – BAYUS, Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: the 
Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter, SSRN Electronic Journal, March 2013; CORDOVA – 
DOLCI – GIANFRATE, The Determinants of Crowdfunding Success: Evidence from Technology 
Projects, Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 181, 2015. 
9
See IVASS document no. 22, October 2014, which modifies ISVAP REgulation no. 36 of January 
31st 2011. In addition, see new consultation document available at   
www.ivass.it/ivass_cms/docs/F19655/Documento_per_la_consultazione_n_26_2015.pdf 
10
Decreto Competitività has modified the past law no. 130/1999 concerning with securitization, 
allowing to special purpose vehicles to borrow financial resources to large enterprises and SMEs. 
11
See PELLEGRINI – TROISI, Gli operatori del mercato finanziario: regolazione e supervisione, 
Corso di diritto pubblico dell’economia, ed. by Pellegrini, Padova, 2016 
12
See SZCZERBOWICZ, The ECB unconventional monetary policies: have they lowered market 
borrowing costs for banks and governments?, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11.4, 
2015; BARIGOZZI – CONTI – LUCIANI, Do euro area countries respond asymmetrically to the 
common monetary policy?, Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics, vol. 76.5, 2014; ESER – 
SCHWAAB, Evaluating the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures: Empirical 
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a smooth support network to the entrepreneurial system. The second category of 
problems related to the negative rate policy relates to the unplanned effects of 
the ECB’s monetary policy; more specifically, in the presence of low rates compa-
nies prefer to invest in technologies rather than in specialised human resources, 
thus increasing the unemployment rate over the longer term. In addition, inves-
tors opt for riskier investments in looking for higher returns, and increase the 
overall systemic instability; finally, older generations tend to spend less because 
they receive more meagre remuneration from their savings, thus decreasing the 
levels of general consumption13. 
 
3. As was previously mentioned, the current economic situation in Italy is 
characterized by the deadlock which has been established due to the combined 
effect of multiple factors, among which are the credit crunch (which damaged 
bank-business relationships), the scarcity of public instruments in support of the 
economy (mainly related to the compliance of the well-known Maastricht limita-
tions), and the uncertainty which can be directly to the structure of the banking 
system. It is therefore necessary to look for valid tools that might help to untangle 
the current knots and increase the strength of Italian and European companies. 
More specifically, it is necessary to identify the operators who are able to finance 
national businesses and the strategic economic sectors. The intervention of these 
entities (mainly mutual funds and investment entities) would have particular posi-
tive effects not only on the performance of the economic system, but also on the 
stability of the financial market; the latter, in fact, could indirectly benefit from the 
economic recovery and support the gradual absorption of so-called non-perform-
ing loans (NPLs)14. 
                                                          
13
See STIGLITZ, What’s Wrong with Negative Rates?, available on Project Syindicate, April 13rd 
2016. 
14
See MAKRI - TSAGKANOS – BELLAS, Determinants of non-performing loans: The case of 
Eurozone, Panoeconomicus, vol. 61.2, 2014; HALE – SANDERSON, How do you solve a 
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With regard to this last issue, it is worth mentioning that the sale strategies 
of non-performing loans are particularly relevant for banking intermediaries and, 
in general, to the entire national economy. In fact, the sale of NPLs allows banks to 
activate so-called "leverage-effects"; thus decreasing balance sheet exposures 
(derived from the sale of these bad credits) and increasing the cash flow which can 
then be granted to families and businesses. 
The introduction of mutual funds that can invest in loans originated by third 
parties or issue them directly is one of the major EU initiatives forming part of the 
restructuring plan for the morphology of the European financial system. Loan 
funds are a potentially valuable tool for European financial efficiency, as well as a 
credible solution to the funding gap faced by SMEs, which actually contribute 58% 
of added value and 67% of employment at the European level. In addition, in-
vestment funds could cooperate with banks in financing particularly expensive 
projects, covering credit needs and different risk levels (in line with the strategic 
criteria of the fund itself). 
In general, the activity of loan funds requires adequate analysis to verify 
that the implemented strategies are conducted in accordance with cost-efficiency 
criteria; this is in order to avoid the creation of adverse selection phenomena and 
an overall deterioration in the quality of financial instruments available in the 
market. In this regard, it must be ensured that the securitization of NPLs reflect 
the real credit rating associated with these instruments, and at the same time that 
the assessments made available by rating agencies are reliable and transparent. 
This is to ensure that the information provided to the public is conveyed in a clear 
and direct way, and is therefore able to facilitate an ex-ante selection of the type 
of investors (retail and professional) to which the potential placement of complex 
financial products is intended. 
The availability of investment funds able to finance the economy and sup-
port economic growth is not limited to loan funds, and includes certain other 
types of funds, all kept together by the high level of specialization and the strong 
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inclination towards productive investments. Some of these are therefore included 
among the EUVECA funds (European venture capital funds, regulated by Regula-
tion (EU) No. 345/2013), the EUSEF funds (European Social Entrepreneurship 
Funds, regulated by Regulation (EU) No. 346/2013) and the ELTIF funds (European 
Long-term investment funds) that encourage the raising of the necessary financial 
resources for specific business projects15. 
More specifically, the European legislator has decided to strengthen the ac-
cess to finance of SMEs by creating an "identity passport" (EU-wide passport) for 
EUVECA funds, and for the EUSEF funds managed by fund managers which are 
subject to the AIFM directive (Alternative Investment Fund managers, directive 
2011/61/EU). On the one hand this delimits the range of action of EU funds (which 
are specifically targeted towards sole innovative projects), but on the other hand 
it ensures the creation of a level playing field throughout EU member States. 
 
4. The European Long term investment fund (ELTIF) is a Pan-European re-
gime for alternative investment funds which raises capital and makes it available 
for loeng term investments in the real economy, in line with the European Union 
objective of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, as mentioned by the Euro-
pean Commission in its Work Programme for 201616. In this respect, specific atten-
tion is paid to efforts by the European regulator to introduce a “New Skills 
Agenda” for Europe involving measures for adopting a circular economy package, 
and long-term financing for European enterprises17.  
                                                          
15
See ASSOGESTIONI, Response to the EU Commission’s Consultation Document – Review of 
the European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA) and European Social Entrepreneurship Funds 
(EuSEF) Regulations, 5th January 2016, where it is highlighted the main role of these funds. In 
fact, «diversification of sources of financing, by levereging on, amongst others, already existing 
EU invesment products, such as EuVECAs, EuSEFs and ELTIFs, can have the potential, if 
appropriately calibrated, to attract investments of both professional and retail investors, and reach 
eligible investment targets that are crucial for the growth of the EU economy, such as SME 
fundings and infrastructure projects». 
16
See European Commission Work Programme 2016 and the new agenda about growth, youth and 
the real economy. 
17
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With regard to new financing opportunities for SMEs and the real economy, 
the European regulator introduced a specific ELTIF Regulation (no. 2015/760 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council) that lays down the minimum re-
quirements which must be met by long-term funds in order to be authorized as a 
European long-term investment fund. However, in line with the rules provided for 
EUVECA and EUSEF, ELTIF must be managed by authorized Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers (regulated by the aforementioned AIFM Directive), and must meet 
minimum eligible asset and diversification requirements.  
ELTIFs may invest (for minimum 70% of its capital) in long term assets such 
as small and medium sized businesses, social infrastructure, transport, sustainable 
energy and communications infrastructure. Moreover, they can raise capital from 
institutional and retail investors across Member States and other European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA). And in fact, pursuant to Regulation Whereas no. 41, given the 
specific characteristics of retail and professional investors, «it is important that 
sound transparency requirements be put in place that are capable of allowing pro-
spective investors to make an informed judgement and be fully aware of the risks 
involved»; furthermore, European regulator addresses some specific requirements 
in terms of cross-border marketing policies, hence naïve investors could be coher-
ently informed about risks, redemption rights, future financial returns, and, above 
all, investment strategies performed by ELTIFs.    
More specifically, the allocation of ELTIF shares requires a deep knowledge 
about the nature of retail investors and their past experience in the investment 
field relevant to the fund; in this respect, ELTIF managers have to clarify retail in-
vestors’ financial situations (including their ability to bear relevant losses), and 
their investment objectives, in terms of time horizon and financial expectations.  
It is worth noting that retail investors suited for ELTIF are characterized by 
                                                                                                                                                                               
d9d6be7099fb.0009.03/DOC_1&format=PDF, where the European regulator underlines that «the 
capacity of the economy to make such long-term financing available depends on the ability of the 
financial system to channel the savings of governments, corporations and households effectively 
and efficiently to the right users and uses through open and competitive markets». 
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such inclination towards long term exposures and illiquid assets to hold in their 
portfolios.  1At the same time, ELTIF could rise money from professional investors, 
which are investor which is considered to be a professional client, or may, on re-
quest, be treated as a professional client in accordance with Annex II to Directive 
2014/65/EU (art. 2). This category typically includes small and medium sized inves-
tors who look for long term investment opportunities and sustainable financial re-
turns in line with a moderate risk level. As was previously mentioned, also in this 
case an ELTIF manager could make investments across European countries, on a 
cross-border basis and in line with the legislative framework provided by AIFM Di-
rective. However, specific attention is paid to applicable investment rules and 
permitted activities, including portfolio diversification rules and a list of prohibited 
activities. In fact, in order to ensure the integrity of ELTIF, it is recommended to 
prohibit an ELTIF from adopting certain investment strategies that involve risky 
transactions and illiquidity financial products. Specific rules are required for in-
vesting in derivatives (that are substantially permitted just for hedging purposes) 
and over-the-counter contracts (such as OTC derivatives) that must be subject to 
Regulation (EU) no. 648/201218 of the European Parliament and of the Council19. 
In fact, as deeply analysed by economical and doctrinal studies, financial deriva-
tives are «cloistered and complex» products, which captured the world’s attention 
as they were born in the flowing stream of globalization; and the development of 
the international financial markets allowed their gradual diffusion among profes-
sional operators and intermediaries20. As a consequence of historical absence of 
                                                          
18
See TROISI – ENGST, ESMA supervision. Specificity of the intervention in the derivatives 
market, Law and Economics Yearly Review, 2013.  
19
See MOLONEY, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, third edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2014. p. 479, where the Author identifies the main issues concerning OTC 
markets, supervision, and transparency; see also LUETTRINGHAUS, Regulating Over-The-
Counter Derivatives In The European Union -- Transatlantic (Dis)Harmony After Emir And Dodd-
Frank: The Impact On (Re)Insurance Companies And Occupational Pension Funds, Columbia 
Journal of European Law, 2012. For an extensive of the legal and regulatory principles underlying 
OTC markets and financial derivatives, see HUDSON, The law on financial derivatives, 5th 
edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012.  
20
See LIPUMA – LEE, Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk, Duke University 
Press, London, 2004; MACKENZIE – MILLO, Negotiating a market, performing theory: The 
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transparency and structural principles ruling counterparties and contractual as-
pects, OTC derivatives are characterised by an enormous volatility that induces in-
vestors to lead with short term fluctuations, and uncontrolled oscillations in ex-
change and interest rates21. It is clear that such a situation is not suitable for 
ELTIFs and, above all, there is no adherence between the former and the financial 
objectives of the latter, also given the long-term strategic orientation that distin-
guishes ELTIFs from other forms of investment funds. 
With regard to the investors and their need of protection, Regulation 
2015/760 provides also rules concerning with fund’s lifetime, redemptions and 
shares’ distribution on secondary markets. In fact, pursuant to art. 18, a specific 
linkage between life of an ELTIF and the shares’ (or units’) redemption, thus inves-
tors in an ELTIF are forced to wait the day following the date of the end of ELTIF’s 
life in order to request the redemption of their shares or units. Derogations from 
this main rule are allowed if specific conditions are fulfilled, such as in case of a 
clear, fairly and time-constrained redemption policy that is initially defined by 
managers and disclosed to investors22.  The reason for this is certainly due to the 
need for maintaining a stable fund platform up to the ELTIF’s lifetime in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                               
historical sociology of a financial derivatives exchange, 2001, available at ssrn.com; WALDMAN, 
OTC Derivatives and Systemic: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, Am. UL. 
Review, vol. 43, 1993. 
21
See BARTRAM - BROWN – FEHLE, International evidence on financial derivatives usage, 
Financial management, vol. 38.1, 2009; BINGHAM – KIESEL, Risk-neutral valuation: Pricing 
and hedging of financial derivatives, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013. 
22
Pursuant to art. 18.2, the conditions under which derogation are allowed are: «(a)  redemptions 
are not granted before the date specified in point (a) of Article 17(1); (b)  at the time of 
authorisation and throughout the life of the ELTIF, the manager of the ELTIF is able to 
demonstrate to the competent authorities that an appropriate liquidity management system and 
effective procedures for monitoring the liquidity risk of the ELTIF are in place, which are 
compatible with the long-term investment strategy of the ELTIF and the proposed redemption 
policy; (c)  the manager of the ELTIF sets out a defined redemption policy, which clearly indicates 
the periods of time during which investors may request redemptions; (d)  the redemption policy of 
the ELTIF ensures that the overall amount of redemptions within any given period is limited to a 
percentage of those assets of the ELTIF which are referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1). This 
percentage shall be aligned to the liquidity management and investment strategy disclosed by the 
manager of the ELTIF; (e)  the redemption policy of the ELTIF ensures that investors are treated 
fairly and redemptions are granted on a pro rata basis if the total amount of requests for 
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engage investments as safer as possible; this in turn means that ELTIF’s lifetime 
has to be necessary coherent with the life-cycle of each asset included in its in-
vestment portfolio, hence ensuring that assets are chosen in the light of their 
time-frame and financial returns. 
And in fact, pursuant to art. 13, an ELTIF’s investment portfolio can be di-
vided as follows: 10% of its capital in instruments issued by any single portfolio 
undertaking; 10% of its capital directly in a single real asset; 10% of its capital in 
units of a single ELTIF, EuVeca or EuSEF23; 5% of its capital in eligible assets for 
UCITS, where those assets have been issued by any single body. These diversifica-
tion requirements seem to be the optimal way to satisfy the interest of the inves-
tors, and, at the same time, it permits to concentrate the ELTIF’s investment policy 
towards industrial projects, SMEs businesses, and undertakings from real econ-
omy24. 
Furthermore, an ELTIF can also operate as loan originator. In this respect, 
some requirements are provided by art. 16: the borrowing of cash is, in fact, per-
mitted by the European regulator only if it represents no more than 30% of the 
value of the capital of the ELTIF; it serves the purpose of investing in eligible in-
vestment assets (except for loans to qualifying portfolio undertakings) provided 
that the holdings in cash or cash equivalents of the ELTIF are not sufficient to 
make the investment concerned; it is contracted in the same currency as the as-
sets to be acquired with the borrower cash; it has a maturity no longer than the 
life of the ELTIF; and finally it encumbers assets that represent no more than 30% 
of the value of the capital of the ELTIF. 
In this way, ELTIFs could concentrate their investment strategies towards 
                                                          
23
In this respect, it is worth noting that The aggregate value of units of ELTIFs, EuvECAs and 
EuSEFs in an ELTIF portfolio must not exceed 20% of the value of the capital of the ELTIF. An 
ELTIF cannot acquire more than 25% of the units or shares of a single ELTIF, EuVECA, or 
EuSEF. 
24
In fact, an ELTIF is prohibited from short selling of assets, taking direct or indirect exposure to 
commodities, and entering into securities lending, securities borrowing, repurchase transactions, or 
any other agreement which has an equivalent economic effect and poses similar risks, if thereby 
more than 10% of the assets of the ELTIF are affected. 
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economically and socially valuable investments, hence contributing to the Euro-
pean economic growth and obtaining political and institutional supports from 
Capital Markets Union and other European institutional initiatives25.  
Finally, European regulator pays specific attention to transparency and to 
provide punctual requirements for the financial prospectus issued for retail inves-
tors in order to prevent them from bearing unjustified losses and unreasonable 
fund misallocations. Pursuant to artt. 23 and 24, units or shares of an ELTIF must 
be marketed in concomitance of the disclosure of key information about their 
risks, returns, investors’ rights, and lifecycle. These pieces of information have to 
be kept up to date, hence in case of relevant changes investors would be able to 
evaluate the level of risks and any potential future disadvantage on the elected in-
vestments.  
As a matter of fact, the prospectus has been playing a key role in financial 
market since its gradual introduction. And in fact, it provides the investors with a 
mandatory disclosure of the issuer’s characteristics and its instruments allocated 
on markets, thus improving also standards of corporate governance and the effec-
tiveness of the implemented financial strategies. Moreover, the prospectus con-
tributes to make available more information on markets, hence ensuring that 
more knowledge is available and «the closer to fairness the prices of securities 
are»26. 
In order to make investors conscious of all potential risks related to an 
ELTIF, the prospectus shall include specific warnings about some relevant aspects 
of the nature of the ELTIF. In this respect, the European regulator highlights the 
key importance of sharing information about the illiquid nature of the ELTIF, the 
long term nature of the performed investments, the redemption rights, the char-
acteristics of investors which the ELTIF is marketed. This latter information is per-
                                                          
25
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Green Paper - Building a Capital Markets Union, 
COM(2015) 63 final, 18th February 2015, p. 3. 
26
See HAENTJENS - DE GIOIA CARABELLESE, European Banking and Financial Law, 
Routledge, 2015, pp. 30 - 31.  
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fectly in line with the principles of “know your customer” and “know the security”, 
introduced by MiFID directive (2004/39/EC), which should ensure the maximum 
investor protection on financial markets27.  
In a nutshell, ELTIFs might provide a solution for current European financial 
and economic issues. In fact, they could create a mutually beneficial cooperation 
between the real economy and the financial markets, thus allowing European in-
vestors to participate in the re-building of the regional economy. Moreover, ELTIFs 
aim at representing an innovative form of European investment funds that will fo-
cus on assets designed to foster social and economic benefit. In fact, the underly-
ing essence of ELTIFs is to facilitate the funding opportunities for SMEs and, at the 
same time, to create a level playing field between operators and undertakings 
from all European countries. Finally, this framework will be able to avoid any reg-
ulatory arbitrage among funds, enterprises and investors in EU, thus the EU inte-
gration could be encouraged and supported by innovative and homogeneous fi-
nancial opportunities.  
 
5. This paper sheds light on the aftermath of the recent EU financial crisis 
which has impacted upon both the banking sector and the financial market in It-
aly. It addresses the most problematic issues arising from the ineffectiveness of 
the ECB’s monetary policies and the pressing need to identify private funding 
bodies who are willing to help to finance national businesses, and to support stra-
tegic economic growth. In reality, access to funding from mutual funds and in-
vestment entities can be difficult to obtain when a venture has limited legitimacy, 
or has suffered a fall in reputation or status, thus ultimately affecting the types of 
funders willing to invest28. Often, companies will use bootstrapping and bricolage 
techniques to ensure their ability to respond to changes in the environment and, 
                                                          
27
See CAPRIGLIONE, Intermediari finanziari, investitori, mercati, Padova, 2008, Chapter 3; DE 
MANUEL ARAMENDIA – VALIANTE, A Life-cycle Approach to Investor Protection, ECMI 
Working Paper, No. 1, September 2014. 
28
See BAKER – NELSON, Creating Something from Nothing: Resource Construction through 
Entrepreneurial Bricolage, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2005, vol. 50 no. 3, p. 329. 
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therefore, to contribute to growth 29. Yet as Baum and Oliver suggest, an organisa-
tion’s chances of success are significantly improved when it is able to develop ties 
with more established organisations30. Therefore, while these EU reforms may 
make access to funding a little more difficult for many, as Singh, House and Tucker 
observed, there is more than one way to create legitimacy and to access re-
sources31. 
 
                                                          
29
See JONES - MACPHERSON - JAYAWARNA, Learning to grow: dynamic capabilities in new 
technology-based firms. OLKC 2011, Conference for Organisational Learning, Knowledge and 
Capabilities, "Making Waves", University of Hull, 12th -14th April, 2011, p. 13. 
30
See BAUM – OLIVER, Institutional Linkages and Organizational Mortality, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, 1991, pp. 187-218. 
31
See SINGH – HOUSE – TUCKER, Organizational Change and Organizational Mortality, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, 1986, pp. 587-61. 
 
